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If surveillance is potentially seen as unfair, then
it is predictable that its proponents will use a
number of methods to reduce public concern:
cover up surveillance activities, devalue targets
and opponents, offer plausible interpretations
for actions, use official processes that give an
appearance of fairness, and intimidate and
bribe targets and opponents. Opponents of
surveillance can be more effective by being
prepared for these tactics and working out
ways to counter them.
Keywords: Surveillance, tactics, opposition,
outrage, resistance
1 Introduction
Over the years, many people have opposed
surveillance, seeing it as an invasion of privacy
or a tool of social control. Dedicated
campaigners and concerned citizens have
opposed bugging of phones, identity cards,
security cameras, database linking and many
other types of surveillance. They have lobbied
and campaigned against abuses and for legal or
procedural restrictions. Others have developed
ways of getting around surveillance.
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In parallel with resistance, there have been
many excellent critiques of surveillance,
exposing its harmful impacts and its role in
authoritarian control (e.g., Dandeker 1990;
Gandy 1993; Garfinkel 2000; Holtzman 2006;
Lyon 1994, 2003; Marx 1988; Murray 1993;
Rosen 2000). However, comparatively little is
written about tactics and strategy against
surveillance. Indeed, social scientists have little
to say about tactics and strategy in any field
(Jasper 2006: xii-xiii). My aim here is to
present a framework for understanding tactics
used in struggles over surveillance.
Actions that are seen to be unfair or to violate
social norms can generate outrage among
observers (Moore 1978). Nonviolence
researcher Gene Sharp (1973: 657-703) found
that violent attacks on peaceful protesters –
something that many people see as unjust –
could be counterproductive for the attackers,
generating greater support for the protesters
among the protesters' supporters, third parties
and even the attacking group. Because of this
potential for attacks to be counterproductive,
attackers, by design or intuition, may take steps
to reduce possible outrage. By examining a
wide range of issues – censorship, unfair
dismissal, violent attacks on peaceful
protesters, torture and aggressive war – a
predictable pattern in tactics can be discerned:
perpetrators regularly use five sorts of methods
to minimise adverse reactions to their actions
(Martin 2007).
1. Cover-up: the action is hidden or disguised.
2. Devaluation: the target of the action is
denigrated.
3. Reinterpretation: plausible explanations are
given for the action.
4. Official channels: experts, formal
investigations or courts are used to give an
appearance of justice.
5. Intimidation and bribery: targets and their
allies are threatened or attacked, or given
incentives to cooperate.
This is called the backfire model: when these
methods are insufficient to dampen public
outrage, the action can backfire on the
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perpetrator. However, backfire is rare: in most
cases, the methods work sufficiently well to
minimise outrage.
Consider an example different from
surveillance: police use force in arresting
someone. This has the potential to cause public
outrage if the force used is seen as unnecessary,
excessive or vindictive. Police in these
circumstances regularly use one or more of the
five methods. If possible, they undertake the
arrest out of the public eye. They refer to the
person arrested as a criminal or by derogatory
terms. If challenged, they claim arrestees were
resisting and that using force was necessary
and carried out according to protocol. They
refer those with grievances to official
complaints procedures, which almost always
rule in favour of the police. And they may
threaten the arrestee with criminal charges
should they make a complaint (Ogletree et al.
1995).
On 3 March 1991, Los Angeles police arrested a
man named Rodney King, in the course of
which King was hit by two 50,000-volt tasers
and beaten with metal batons more than 50
times. This arrest would have gone unnoticed
except that George Holliday, who lived nearby,
recorded the beating on his new videocamera.
When footage was shown on television, it
caused a massive public and political reaction
against the Los Angeles police. Holliday's
videotape cut through the normal cover-up and
allowed viewers to judge the events for
themselves, overriding the police's
interpretation of the events and the media's
normal police-sympathetic framing (Lawrence
2000). Nevertheless, in the ensuing saga the
police and their supporters used every one of
the five methods of inhibiting outrage –
though, unusually, in this case their efforts
were unsuccessful in preventing a huge
backlash against the police (Martin 2005).
Tactics for and against surveillance can be
analysed using the same framework. The
foundation for public outrage is a sense of
unfairness. This is certainly present at least
some of the time: people may see surveillance
as an invasion of privacy (as with hidden video
cameras), as a tool of repression (as in
monitoring dissenters) or a tool of exploitation
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(as in monitoring of workers). The very word
"surveillance" is a tool in opposing it, because
the word has such negative connotations.
A sense of unfairness is not inherent in the act
of observing someone or collecting and
analysing data about them. People's sense of
unfairness is the subject of a continual struggle,
with privacy campaigners trying to increase
concern and purveyors of surveillance
techniques trying to reduce it. Methods to
inhibit or amplify outrage are used within the
prevailing set of attitudes and in turn affect
those attitudes.
Given that some people see surveillance as
inappropriate, unfair, dangerous or damaging,
there is a potential for resistance and hence it is
predictable that one or more of the five
methods of inhibiting outrage will be deployed.
In the remainder of this paper, I look at each of
the five methods of inhibiting outrage and ways
to challenge these methods.
The five-method classification used here is a
convenient framework for examining tactics for
and against surveillance. To use this framework
does not require actors to be consciously
engaging in a struggle, as many are simply
reacting to the circumstances in which they
find themselves. For those who are concerned
about surveillance, though, it is useful to think
in terms of tactics and strategies.
2 Cover-up and exposure
Surveillance is commonly carried out in secret.
When people don't realise it's happening, they
are far less likely to become concerned about it.
The secrecy covering surveillance is part of a
wider pattern of government and corporate
secrecy (Roberts 2006).
Political surveillance of individuals is normally
done surreptitiously. Bugs are installed in
residences; telephones are tapped; remote
cameras record movement; police in plain
clothes observe at a discrete distance. There is
an obvious reason for this: targets, if they know
about surveillance, are better able to avoid or
resist it. But secrecy is maintained beyond
operational necessities: in most cases, the
existence of surveillance is kept secret long
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afterwards, often never to be revealed.
Exposures may require exceptional
circumstances (Marx 1984), such as the
collapse of East Germany's communist regime
or the "liberation" of FBI files at Media,
Pennsylvania in 1971 by the Citizens'
Commission to Investigate the FBI (Cowan et
al. 1974). When surveillance is exposed, for
example FBI surveillance of individuals such as
Martin Luther King, Jr. and John Lennon, it
can cause outrage. The revelation that the
National Security Agency had been spying on
US citizens since 2002 caused a massive
adverse reaction.
Employers sometimes do not want to tell
workers they are being monitored, when there
is a possibility this may stimulate individual or
collective resistance. (On other occasions
employers are open about monitoring, when
this serves to induce compliance.)
Under the US Patriot Act, the FBI can obtain
secret warrants to obtain records from libraries,
Internet service providers and other
organisations. The organisations subject to this
intrusion cannot reveal it, under severe
penalties. This draconian enforcement of
secrecy serves to reduce personal and popular
concern about surveillance, for example when
the Patriot Act is used against non-terrorist
groups such as antiwar protesters.
In some cases, surveillance becomes routinised,
so cover-up is less important. In many areas,
camera monitoring is carried out openly: it is
possible to observe oneself, on a screen,
walking into a shop. On the other hand, some
forms of surveillance are hidden so effectively
that they are completely outside of most
people's awareness, for example collection of
web data, meshing of database files, police
checks on car licence numbers and recording of
bank transactions.
The importance of low visibility in enabling
surveillance to continue and expand is
apparent through a thought experiment:
imagine that you received, at the end of every
month, a list of instances in which data had
been collected about you, by whom and for
what purpose. Imagine knowing whether you
had been placed on a list to be denied a loan or
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a job.
Exposing surveillance is crucial to challenging
it. Exposure requires collection of information,
putting it into a coherent, persuasive form,
providing credible backing for the evidence,
and communicating to a receptive audience.
Sometimes a single person can do all of these
steps, collecting information directly and
publishing it on the web. Normally, though, a
chain of participants is involved, for example
an insider who leaks documents, a researcher
who prepares an analysis, a journalist who
writes a story and an editor or producer who
publishes it. Campaigners help in exposure, as
with Privacy International's Big Brother
Awards for organisations with bad records in
threatening privacy.
3 Devaluation and validation
If a person is perceived as unworthy, then
people don't get as upset when bad things are
done to them. Executing an innocent person is
seen as outrageous; executing a serial murderer
elicits less concern. The inmates of the US
prison at Guantánamo were portrayed as the
"worst of the worst"; abrogating the civil rights
of people painted as terrorists was accepted by
much of the population, at least initially.
It is to be expected, therefore, that proponents
of surveillance will denigrate targets as a means
to justify their operations. Three popular labels
for targets of surveillance are criminals,
terrorists and paedophiles. Who could be
opposed to fingerprinting welfare recipients if
it prevents cheating? Who could be opposed to
monitoring of emails or cameras on every street
corner if it helps deter paedophiles?
Furthermore, devaluation is extended to those
who oppose surveillance, who are said to be
defending criminals, terrorists and
paedophiles.
The trite expression "If you have nothing to
hide, you have nothing to fear" is built on an
implicit devaluation: if you're concerned about
privacy and surveillance, you must have
something to hide, which implies you're guilty
and devious (Marx 2007). Therefore,
surveillance seems to be justified.
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One way to challenge devaluation is to
emphasise the essential humanity of every
individual. A powerful way to do this is to make
targets human, by using names, photos and
personal details. Australian David Hicks was
incarcerated without trial at Guantánamo for
over five years without trial, and stigmatised by
the Australian government as a terrorist.
Opponents of Hicks' treatment were eventually
able to generate concern, using photos of Hicks
to make him appear as an ordinary person.
Hicks' father Terry spoke out on his behalf, as
did his US military lawyer Michael Mori:
having valued allies helps counter devaluation.
The same principle applies to validating targets
of surveillance. Personal stories of individuals
subject to political surveillance are potent tools
for validation. For example, Penn Kimball
(1984) in his book The File poignantly tells of
discovering spy agency files about himself in
1978, three decades after they were initiated on
a flimsy pretext. The 2006 German film The
Lives of Others encouraged the viewer to
identify with the targets of East German
political surveillance and with the Stasi agent
who came to sympathise with them. Personal
stories of innocent victims of surveillance gone
wrong are similarly powerful. A few people will
respond to abstract arguments about human
rights; many more will respond to personal
stories. George Orwell's novel 1984, a powerful
portrait of a dystopian future, uses the personal
story of Winston Smith to make larger political
points.
4 Interpretation struggles
Proponents of measures that increase
surveillance typically provide a justification,
often in terms that resonate with widely
accepted values. Identification of vehicles is to
monitor traffic, detect lawbreakers or collect
congestion fees; compilation of corporate
databases is to increase efficiency and provide
better customer service; cameras are to prevent
crime; identity cards are to reduce fraud;
baggage checks are to prevent terrorism. The
most effective justifications have an element of
truth, sometimes quite a large element. The
increase in surveillance is simply a by-product,
deemed insignificant and unproblematical.
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Proponents typically exaggerate the
effectiveness of measures. One powerful way to
do this is to treat effectiveness as self-evident.
Cameras on public streets deter crime, of
course. Who could doubt it? Seldom is
empirical evidence provided; perhaps little is
collected or sought. This is an especially potent
technique because it doesn't require the public
to trust what authorities say, because members
of the public are the ones drawing the
conclusion. Airline travellers who, in order to
fly, tolerate pointless checks through bags and
removal of fingernail files and nail clippers may
not question the assumption that such
measures are deterring terrorists.
Proponents seldom discuss alternative ways of
accomplishing the same goal. An alternative
approach to aircraft hijackings is to train
passengers in how to communicate with each
other and organise to overcome terrorists, as
occurred spontaneously on 9/11 United Airlines
flight 93 (Scarry 2003). This approach involves
trusting passengers and increasing their
awareness and skills rather than treating them
as potential terrorists. It is seldom mentioned
by government authorities, who focus
exclusively on measures that give agencies
greater power. Radical alternatives are seldom
articulated. Rather than keep extensive records
on poor people to prevent them cheating on
welfare, an alternative is to increase the level of
free distribution. For example, free or low-cost
food could be provided to anyone who wants it,
an expansion of current welfare services. This
would reduce the need to monitor individuals.
Problems with surveillance systems are
typically said to be rare or non-existent.
Sometimes, though, surveillance abuses are
publicised, for example cases in which someone
has been denied a loan due to incorrect
information on a database. These are explained
away as rare mistakes. Then there are the
systemic abuses, such as the illegal selling of
information from databases – for example
those held by police – to private investigators
and others. These are commonly attributed to
rogue operators. The system of information
collection is not blamed.
In summary, proponents of surveillance
typically provide a plausible justification for
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measures, exaggerate or simply assume their
effectiveness, ignore alternatives and explain
away abuses as rare events due to rogue
elements.
Opponents of surveillance have challenged
every one of these interpretative techniques.
Most importantly, they have highlighted the
potential of existing or potential systems to
increase unnecessary and damaging
surveillance. They have challenged claims or
assumptions about effectiveness. They have
proposed alternatives. And they have argued
that abuses are symptoms of flawed systems.
One of the key elements of interpretation
struggles is the language used. Proponents of
intrusive measures almost never use the word
"surveillance." For example, cameras are called
security cameras, not surveillance cameras.
What about opponents? It is common to refer
to use the language of "privacy," which
resonates with people's concerns about the
sanctity of private life. But privacy rhetoric has
disadvantages, in particular that it is personal
in focus, whereas surveillance is largely an
institutional practice (Stalder 2002).
John Gilliom (1994) analysed the arguments
used for and against compulsory drug testing in
US workplaces in the 1980s. Proponents
justified testing mainly in terms of safety at
work, the drug problem generally and the
productivity of drug users, whereas opponents
mainly cited privacy followed by legal rights,
testing error and other concerns, of which
surveillance was mentioned by only a few.
Gilliom argues that rights discourse was limited
because the law is constructed to serve the
powerful, and improvements in drug test
methods addressed concerns about errors
while allowing the testing to continue. The
implication of Gilliom's analysis is that
opponents' choices of arguments against testing
can have a major influence on the success of
opposition generally, because arguments lead
to particular ways of challenging testing –
including legal methods, a form of official
channel.
5 Official channels
Courts, ombudsmen, grievance procedures and
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formal inquiries are examples of official
channels. Many people believe that these
provide justice. They do in quite a few cases,
but when the perpetrator is far more powerful
than the victim, official channels typically give
only an illusion of justice. For example, some
people who speak out in the public interest are
nominally protected by whistleblower laws, but
in practice these laws provide little or no
protection (De Maria 1999). Official channels
are typically slow, focused on procedural
technicalities, dependent on experts (such as
lawyers) and keep matters out of the public
eye. They are the exact opposite of using
publicity to mobilise public concern.
Regulatory agencies for protecting privacy fit
this mould.
Some opponents of drug testing in US
workplaces took cases to courts, some of which
opposed testing. However, the Supreme Court
supported testing, so the legal approach failed
overall (Gilliom 1994). Along the way, it soaked
up a large amount of money and effort, took a
long time, distracted energy away from other
opposition options, and enabled proponents to
achieve an authoritative legal opinion in favour
of testing.
In Australia, the Privacy Commissioner, a
government-funded office, can receive
complaints and make judgements. But its role
is severely constrained. The Commissioner has
to operate within the current law, which for
example does not cover private sector uses of
information. As soon as the law is changed, for
example to allow another type of database
matching, the Commissioner must accept this
as the new framework for judging privacy
concerns. Furthermore, the Commissioner
cannot do much to oppose any practices that it
judges to be violations. Anyone who looks to
the Privacy Commissioner for relief from actual
invasions of privacy, or to halt a new practice, is
likely to be disappointed (Davies, 1996).
In most countries, government agencies
charged with protecting privacy have been
ceding ground for decades. There are some
legislative and administrative constraints on
surveillance, to be sure, but agencies provide
little for anyone seeking redress. If you know or
suspect that your employer has been
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monitoring your email, that your telephone
company has been releasing logs about your
calls or that information about your purchases
is on a corporate database, you can approach
any number of agencies, most likely to find out
that either the practice is legal, that you have
no right to know, or that no information is
available to you.
There are many people working in or with
agencies who are dedicated to the public
interest. The problem is not motivation but the
role of agencies in the social structure: they are
given limited mandates and inadequate
funding, must operate according to
bureaucratic regulations and have little or no
capacity to initiate significant change. They can
be simply overwhelmed by contrary forces,
such as the post-9/11 war on terror. Finally, a
really effective agency, that gets in the way of
powerful interests, is likely to have its funding
cut or mandate restricted.
The implication is that opponents of
surveillance should not look to official channels
as the solution. Stronger laws and well-funded
oversight bodies can be worthwhile, but it is a
mistake to put too much energy into promoting
them, especially because reforms can so easily
be rolled back (Olmsted 1996). Increasing
public concern should be the primary goal, and
that means publicising the issues, gaining
supporters, building alliances and developing
campaigns. If these efforts are effective, it is
likely that governments will create or bolster
official bodies to try to convince people that the
problem is well in hand.
In 2005, the British government introduced the
Serious Organised Crime and Police Act, which
includes a provision requiring protesters within
one kilometre of Parliament Square to obtain a
permit, a requirement that allows files on
radicals to be compiled. To even wear a T-shirt
with a slogan requires a permit. Activist
comedian Mark Thomas (2007) promoted
"Mass Lone Demos" by thousands of people
with diverse causes, for example some
opposing the Iraq war and others whimsically
opposing the month of February, overloading
the police with permit requests and making fun
of the law.
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6 Intimidation, bribery and
resistance
Surveillance measures can be intimidating: no
one likes to imagine that their conversations
and actions are being recorded. Having one's
photo and fingerprints taken by a government
body can be humiliating and stigmatising.
Intimidation serves to reduce expressions of
resistance. Local critics of surveillance abuses
are likely to come under increased surveillance
themselves, rather like the way peace activists
can end up on US government no-fly lists.
(Prominent critics may be a bit safer, because
surveillance of them, if discovered and
disclosed, could generate more publicity.)
There is also a parallel process of
encouragement to go along with intrusive
measures. If you supply your identification
card, you have access to government services. If
you allow cookies, you have access to certain
websites. If you allow your licence number to
be recorded, you can drive on certain roads.
Surveillance often comes along with benefits.
Accepting the benefits creates a psychological
debt: a greater willingness to accept
surveillance.
To oppose surveillance, there need to be some
people willing to resist. Insiders, with
knowledge of abuses, can leak information to
public critics. Investigative journalists can
probe political surveillance. Citizens can expose
what has happened to them. This is resistance
aimed at mobilising wider awareness of
surveillance and its damaging effects.
Many individuals attempt to avoid or disrupt
surveillance, for example by giving incorrect
information on forms, joining campaigns
against identity cards, or damaging speed
cameras. If actions are widely taken up, they
can have a major impact and can stimulate
development of new methods of resistance.
Using and promoting encryption is an example.
If everyone puts some encrypted files on their
computer and sends occasional encrypted
emails, even if they have nothing to hide, this
makes it harder for snoops to determine who is
worth watching. This is especially important in
repressive regimes, where use of encryption
might be seen as implying subversive activities.
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Struggles to enable access to encryption
technology are a vital part of resistance
(Schneier & Banisar 1997).
Gary Marx (2003) has distinguished 11
different types of individual resistance to
surveillance, for example avoiding detection,
blocking intrusive measures, refusing to
provide information, and encouraging
surveillance agents not to enforce regulations.
He gives examples of each type of resistance
and argues that there will be an ongoing
struggle between controllers and resisters, with
total control being unrealisable.
Methods of intimidation are often linked to
cover-up. Beginning in the 1970s, CovertAction
Information Bulletin challenged secret
agencies by exposing the identities of
undercover CIA agents; in response, the US
Congress in 1982 passed a law against this. This
law later led to a giant scandal when
government officials revealed the identity of
CIA agent Valerie Plame in reprisal against her
husband Joseph Wilson for questioning false
claims used to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq
(Wilson 2005).
This case suggests that data-gathering can
sometimes be turned against powerful groups.
Normally, the groups that instigate and run
surveillance systems, such as politicians,
employers, top bureaucrats and spy agencies,
are not equally subject to the techniques they
use against others. For example, employers
may monitor workers but workers are seldom
able to monitor employers to the same extent.
Collecting data about the rich and powerful,
putting them on a par with others, challenges
and deters intimidation. In other words, if the
rich and powerful want surveillance, then make
sure the searchlight is turned on them as well
as others.
7 Conclusion
In order to gain insight into struggles over
surveillance, it is useful to analyse the methods
typically used by perpetrators of perceived
injustice to reduce outrage over their actions.
The promoters of surveillance commonly hide
their operations, denigrate the targets and
critics of surveillance, give plausible
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justifications for operations, set up oversight
bodies that have little power to challenge
anything more than minor violations of
regulations, intimidate opponents and provide
incentives for cooperation. To refer to
"promoters of surveillance" and describe their
methods does not imply any conscious intent
on their part: many of them do not see
themselves as promoting surveillance, but
rather as cracking down on crime, providing
better consumer service or increasing the
efficiency of service systems: they believe in
their own interpretations of what is happening.
Likewise, to speak about the methods used to
reduce outrage need not imply any conscious
strategy: these methods are simply intuitive or
obvious ways to reduce opposition.
The value of looking at methods used by
promoters of surveillance is that it gives
guidance for opponents. Some of these are
fairly obvious, including exposing abuses and
explaining what is wrong with surveillance.
Others are less so, in particular being sceptical
of official channels and instead mobilising
support. Over the decades, many critics of
surveillance have advocated stronger
regulations, yet these have been regularly
superseded by new technologies, overturned by
emergency powers, undermined by loopholes
and made hollow by weak enforcement.
According to the model used here – reflecting
studies of a wide range of domains – relying on
regulations is seriously flawed: to a
considerable extent, it gives only the
appearance of dealing with problems,
dampening public concern while allowing
developments to continue.
To challenge surveillance, according to the
framework used here, public outrage needs to
be fostered in a range of ways. The model gives
guidance for actions that are likely to be
effective, but it does not say who will or should
take action. Dedicated opponents have too
often been overwhelmed by the forces
promoting surveillance. In such circumstances,
even the best tactics may be inadequate.
Nevertheless, it is far too soon to lose heart.
Many other social movements – against slavery,
for women's emancipation, against
environmental destruction – only gained
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widespread support after decades or centuries
of exploitation and damage. Surveillance may
become more ubiquitous and insidious, but
there remains a strong reservoir of public
concern about privacy, autonomy and freedom.
Today's critics and campaigners are laying the
basis for a future challenge to emerge.
Understanding tactics can help make that
challenge more effective.
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